JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. When did the British come to regard Americans as foreigners? There are many difficulties involved in trying to answer this question. Perhaps most obvious, there was no single British perspective; at any given time there was a multiplicity of opinions, and gauging which views were general and which were idiosyncratic is by no means easy. It can readily be imagined that merchants who traded with the colonies probably had little difficulty in conceiving of their inhabitants as part of the British nation. After all, such merchants were accustomed to thinking in terms of a transatlantic whole: John Wright, in the preface to his account of the currencies of the colonies, explained that his work was intended "for the general Use of all His Britannic Majesty's Subjects, whether residing in Europe or America."3 By the same reasoning, it can be seen why Britons who lived
When did the British come to regard Americans as foreigners? There are many difficulties involved in trying to answer this question. Perhaps most obvious, there was no single British perspective; at any given time there was a multiplicity of opinions, and gauging which views were general and which were idiosyncratic is by no means easy. It can readily be imagined that merchants who traded with the colonies probably had little difficulty in conceiving of their inhabitants as part of the British nation. After all, such merchants were accustomed to thinking in terms of a transatlantic whole: John Wright, in the preface to his account of the currencies of the colonies, explained that his work was intended "for the general Use of all His Britannic Majesty's Subjects, whether residing in Europe or America."3 By the same reasoning, it can be seen why Britons who lived more insular or locally oriented lives were less likely to be so inclusive. Indeed, it must be conceded that many Britons almost certainly thought of the colonies rarely, if at all, and therefore had no formed view of whether the Americans should be seen as fellow-nationals. Even in 1776, when relations with the Americans were distinctly topical so far as the press and politicians were concerned, a visitor to Wales noted that the people he met "know as little as they care."4
Nor was there a single defining moment when the general viewinsofar as we can discern it-was transformed; but rather a long drawnout process of change. This process, moreover, should not be seen as one of linear progression. There was no smooth and uninterrupted transition in the way in which Britons in Britain looked on Americans; a jagged, broken and faltering movement-like a drunkard lurching forward and then tottering back-is a more appropriate image. There seem to have been times when most of the British chose to be inclusive and times when they were more parochial. Wartime crises and triumphs tended to bring these shifts into sharp relief.
The chronological boundaries of this process are difficult to pin down. Even the acknowledgment of American Independence by the British state in I782-I783 did not stop some Britons from trying to revive the idea of the British as a transatlantic people. The earl of Shelburne continued to harbor hopes of a constitutional connection with the Americans even as he negotiated the peace treaties, and in the years immediately after the War of Independence he sought to give the United States a special position in trade with Britain and its remaining colonies, which would effectively have allowed the Americans to continue to enjoy the status of Britons for commercial purposes.5 Shelburne's initial proposals ran aground in a hostile House of Commons in March 1783, and his failure is a sign that by this stage the majority of MPs saw the independent Americans as foreigners, but this did not end hopes that some form of Anglo-American union could be restored.6 Joseph Chamberlain's late-nineteenth-century vision of "Greater Britain," incorporating Britain, Canada, and the United States, is a reminder of the persistence of this type of thinking.7
If the end of the process is not clear-cut, neither is its beginning. Timothy Breen has suggested that Americans began to formulate a new identity in response to an assertive English nationalism that seemed to be marginalizing the colonists. He sees this exclusive English nationalism as emerging from the mid-eighteenth century. P. J. Marshall has shown that the Seven Years' War, and the constitutional clashes between Britain and the colonies that followed it, led to a British reassessment of the Americans. Eliga Gould, by contrast, has argued that the beginning of the Seven Years' War witnessed a great swelling of British inclusiveness, as British politicians and the British public turned away from Continental Europe and embraced the North American colonies with a new fervor. Only with the coming of the War of Independence, in Gould's view, did this sense of an extended, transatlantic British nation break down. 8 Opinions expressed in the press, in Parliament, and in private diaries and letters suggest that the nature and course of the American war itself were the vital determinants of the movement in British thinking. The fighting after the initial skirmishes at Lexington and Concord gave a great boost to changing attitudes on the British side. Long before the formal recognition of the United States in the peace negotiations, many Britons-perhaps most Britons-seem to have seen the Americans as a distinct and separate people. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, this owed very little to the Declaration of Independence, the implications of which seem to have been largely ignored in Britain. The key event was neither Lexington nor the Declaration, but the Franco-American alliance and the broadening of the conflict from 1778, when first the French, then the Spanish, and finally the Dutch became enemies of the British. Many years ago, Colin Bonwick demonstrated the way in which this connection between the Americans and the European powers, especially France, caused acute problems for British radicals who had supported colonial claims.9 But the American association with France-and subsequently with Britain's other European foes-was not just a difficulty for radicals; it convinced a wide spectrum of Britons that the Americans were no longer part of the same nation. The French alliance flew in the face of the Gallophobia that had united Britons and Americans for generations, and the breach widened as America came to be associated with the other European powers that had joined the war as enemies of Britain.
During the eighteenth century, it must be acknowledged, Americans were often identified as different from metropolitan Britons. Given the local situation of the colonists, and their distance from the mother country, some measure of variation was inevitable. Sometimes their status as a frontier people made them appear as purer and less corrupt: Sylas Neville, a warm supporter of colonial resistance to the claims of the British Parliament, pronounced in April I768 that "the body of the people in America are much more virtuous and understand the nature of Liberty better than the body of the people here."10 Less favorably, distance from the metropolitan center could lead the colonists to be portrayed as unpolished and lacking refinement; upper-class army officers were inclined to be scornful of the dullness of life in the colonies and the unsophisticated nature of their inhabitants ("All the Women are exceedingly Vulgar," was one distinctly unflattering verdict on the ladies of Philadelphia's "best society.")'1 The transportation of British and Irish convicts to the colonies was also cited as a reason for regarding the Americans as distinct. The numbers involved were not in fact very great; an estimated 30,000 crossed the Atlantic between 1718 and I775, out of a total of perhaps 217,000 migrants from the British Isles to North America in roughly the same period.12 But this did not stop some contemporaries from assuming that the character of the colonies had been fundamentally affected. Samuel Johnson is reported as having viewed the Americans in 1769 as "a race of convicts."13 Unsurprisingly, this line of thinking became more prominent once the War of Independence began: "a scape Gallows race, the genuine progeny of their worthy Ancestors from Newgate and the Old Baily," was how they were to be described by one army officer.14 Other in-comers were similarly seen by some Britons as compromising the Britishness of the colonies. Significant numbers of Germans arrived in the course of the eighteenth century: by the end of the colonial period about Io percent of the population of British North America was German-speaking, and in Pennsylvania, the most cosmopolitan province, one-third. Yet none of these distinguishing features necessarily made white Americans non-British. Distance and lack of sophistication did not have to disqualify Americans from being considered as Britons; it could easily lead to their being regarded as "provincials," in much the same way that Devonians or Lancastrians might be seen by Londoners. The transported convicts were mainly from Britain, so their presence hardly made the colonies less British. Disparaging comments about the Germans and their influence on the character of the colonies were not common; Innes's claims, it should be noted, were made once the American war had begun, and Innes himself took a particularly hard line on colonial issues.18 There had, admittedly, been earlier expressions of unease about the Germanification of Pennsylvania-especially from Benjamin Franklin-and some worries were voiced about the reliability of the German arrivals in the event of a war with the French. But Naturalization Acts from 1740 to 1761 demonstrated the determination of the British state to assimilate the Germans, and turn them, effectively, into Britons. The Germans themselves, it might be added, were far from resistant to integration. While they retained their own customs and cultures, and spoke German in the home and other social settings, they usually used English in their business and official dealings and even, in some cases, anglicized their names. This readiness to adapt might help to explain why there is little evidence that Britons generally saw German immigration as a serious threat to the British-ness of British North America.19 So far as slavery was concerned, Edmund Burke, in a wellknown speech, claimed that it had the effect of making the colonists more jealous of their liberty-a liberty derived from their British, or English, constitutional heritage.20 As for the Native Americans, their use as a symbol or personification of America owed much to the lack of any easy alternative way of identifying Americans in caricatures. The Britons the Americans did not automatically become foreigners on their renouncing allegiance to George III in I776. As a British periodical remarked, the history of the year 1778 was dominated by "the History of the British Nation, however separated, or into whatever divisions unhappily thrown."27 Common blood, in short, seems to have been more important than common allegiance. The collective conception of Americans as descended from people born in the British Isles was a prime qualification for their being regarded as fellow-Britons, especially as the ties of language and consanguinity were often reinforced and refreshed by continuing connections-familial, commercial, educational-with the mother country. The presence in the colonies of inhabitants who had neither direct nor distant connections with the British Isles does not-as we have seen-appear to have undermined seriously the assumption that as "kith and kin" the Americans were British. Naturalized foreigners were able to secure the rights of the king's natural-born subjects, both in Britain itself and in North America. While peoples incorporated into the empire through conquest might remain "foreigners," foreigners who came to the British Isles or the British colonies could, over time, become British. This seems to have been the case with the French Huguenots who came to the British Isles and the British colonies, particularly after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in I685, and also, though perhaps to a lesser extent, with the German settlers who flocked to North America from the I68os.28
That the vast majority of non-British arrivals were Protestants made their acceptance and eventual assimilation much easier. Catholics, it must be said, although subject to many restrictions and penalties, were able to live both in Britain and in the colonies without insufferable molestation, especially in times of peace. Indeed, in some places they seem to have been well integrated into largely Protestant communities.29 27 Annual Register, 21 (I778), "Preface," iii. 28 Colonies."58 Britons, in other words, began to associate the Americans not so much with themselves as with other groups over which the British state claimed authority-from French Canadians and Native Americans to Bengalis. It was no coincidence, surely, that it was in I763 that Lord Halifax expressed the opinion that "the people of England" considered the Americans "though H. M.'s subjects, as foreigners."59 When the colonists began to resist British efforts to impose greater central control over the expanded empire, it seems that more Britons adopted this attitude. After listening to the debates on the repeal of the Stamp Act, an exasperated opponent of repeal wrote in his diary that he could not understand why it was necessary to make such a concession to There were, then, many stages in the process of British estrangement from the Americans, and many very different reasons for that estrangement. In the aftermath of the Seven Years' War the expansion of the British empire led, perhaps subconsciously, to a loss of status for the Americans so far as many Britons were concerned. Instead of being associated with Britons in Britain, they came to be associated with the various other peoples of the newly acquired territories. British Americans, Native Americans, French Canadians, even Bengalis, were all now subjects of the British crown, to be ruled over by the British state. But insofar as we can identify a general and pronounced shift in British attitudes, it came during the American war. The Americans' own Declaration of Independence was not, it seems, important in bringing about a change on the British side. Renouncing their allegiance to the king did not turn the Americans into a separate nation. More important in this respect were the nature and course of the conflict. The scale of the rebellion and the apparent weakness of American loyalism were sufficient to convince some Britons that the Americans had to be regarded as an enemy, much like any other. Washington's reputation and the growing professionalism and success of the American armed forces, and particularly the Continental army, added to the tendency for the Americans to be treated and regarded as belligerents rather than rebels. But it was perhaps above all the broadening of the war from 1778 that persuaded most Britons to look at the Americans in a different light. The expansion of the conflict effectively completed the process of national redefinition on the British side. Rather than being viewed as wayward children to be chastised, the Americans became associated in the minds of many Britons with the French-the traditional and deeply hated foe-then with the Spanish, and finally with the Dutch. From being a part of the extended British nation, they became part of a formidable coalition arrayed against Britain. From fellow-Britons, they became foreigners.
